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CRIMINAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, from January 1988 to August 1989, the New

Mexico Court of Appeals decided two cases clarifying the New Mexico
Racketeering Act.' The court of appeals also examined and compared
the statutory elements of fraud and the offenses created by the Worthless
Check Act. 2 In addition, the court of appeals held that attempted trafficking by possession with intent to distribute constitutes a crime in New
Mexico.3 The court of appeals also discussed the quantum of evidence
necessary to support the inference of "constructive possession" of contraband, 4 and examined the entrapment defense.5 The New Mexico Supreme Court clarified6 the elements of the crime of holding or using an
altered license plate.
Also during the survey period, defendants raised several challenges to
laws penalizing drunk driving and the procedure involved in arrest and
prosecution of drunk drivers. 7 This article has treated these cases separately. The most interesting challenges implicated equal protection.8
II. RACKETEERING
During the survey period two significant cases involved the New Mexico
Racketeering Act 9 ("the Act"), a piece of legislation greatly influenced

1. State v. Hughes, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767
P.2d 354 (1989); State v. Wynne, 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108
N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989). See infra notes 16-54 and accompanying text.
2. State v. Higgins, 107 N.M. 617, 762 P.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1988). See infra notes 67-80 and
accompanying text.
3. State v. Curry, 107 N.M. 133, 753 P.2d 1321 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753
P.2d 1320 (1988). See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
4. State v. Brietag, 108 N.M. 368, 772 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989). See infra notes 91-103 and
accompanying text.
5. State v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546,
761 P.2d 424 (1988). See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
6. Ortiz v. State, 106 N.M. 695, 749 P.2d 80 (1988). See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying
text.
7. Incorporated County of Los Alamos v. Montoya, 108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 108 N.M. 273, 771 P.2d 981 (1989); State v. Wyrostek, 108 N.M. 140, 767 P.2d 379
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989); State v. Wiberg, 107 N.M. 152, 754
P.2d 529 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 106, 753 P.2d 352 (1988); Meyer v. Jones, 106 N.M.
708, 749 P.2d 93 (1988). See infra notes 124-203 and accompanying text.
8. Meyer, 106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93; Montoya, 108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891. See infra notes
124-80 and accompanying text.
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Cases decided during the survey
period involving the Racketeering Act were State v. Hughes, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989); State v. Wynne, 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d
373 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989); and Maxwell v. Wilson,
108 N.M. 65, 766 P.2d 909 (1988). In Maxwell, a civil case not discussed below, the supreme court
held that the existence of an "enterprise" standing alone will not sustain a suit for civil damages
under the Racketeering Act. Id. at 67, 766 P.2d at 911. The Act provides civil remedies in § 3042-6. The Maxwell court indicated that to avoid dismissal the civil plaintiff must allege one of the
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by the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).' 0 The stated purpose of the New Mexico Racketeering Act is to
"eliminate the infiltration and illegal acquisition of legitimate economic
enterprise by racketeering practices and the use of legal and illegal enterprise to further criminal activities."" "Racketeering" means virtually
any felonious act.' 2 A "pattern of racketeering activity" means that the
defendant has engaged in two or more incidents of racketeering, with a
few exceptions, provided that the acts are done with the special intent
of accomplishing the activities prohibited under the Act."' The prohibited
activities are set out in section 30-42-4 of the Act and comprise, essentially,
the use of "racketeering" to participate in an "enterprise.' ' 4 An "enterprise" is any legal entity "or any group of individuals or group of
individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity and includes illicit
as well as licit entities."' 15
New Mexico courts followed the lead of the majority of the federal
courts interpreting RICO by reading the Act broadly to allow prosecution
of any but the most solitary and sporadic criminal activity. In State v.
Hughes 6 and State v. Wynne,17 the court of appeals considered appeals
of convictions for conspiracy to racketeer by defendants who manufactured drugs for sale. The court rejected these defendants' challenges to
the Act. The rejections were based in part on judicial interpretation of
the federal racketeering act.
In State v. Hughes, the court of appeals held that the day-to-day
operations of drug manufacturers may fall within the state racketeering
act.' 8 Hughes was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance by
manufacture, racketeering, and conspiracy to racketeer. 9 The facts supporting the racketeering charge were all instances of2 conduct related to
Hughes' methamphetamine manufacturing operation . 0
Hughes advanced several arguments attempting to show that his conduct
did not fall within the Racketeering Act. He argued that because the
government had not proved the existence of an association beyond that
in existence to manufacture methamphetamine, the government had failed

predicate criminal acts set out in section 30-42-3(A) of the Act. Id.
Prior to the survey period, the New Mexico courts have interpreted the Racketeering Act only
once, in State v. Johnson, 105 N.M. 63, 728 P.2d 473 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051
(1987).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984); See State v. Johnson, 105 N.M. at 69, 728 P.2d at 479 (the
New Mexico Racketeering Act is "patterned after" RICO).
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
12. See id. § 30-42-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
13. See id. § 30-42-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
14. See id. § 30-42-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
15. Id. § 30-42-3(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
16. 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354 (1989).
17. 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989).
18. Hughes, 108 N.M. at 150-51, 767 P.2d at 389-90.
19. Id. at 145, 767 P.2d at 384.
20. Id. at 147, 767 P.2d at 386.
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to prove the existence of an "enterprise" as required by the Act. 2 He
argued that even if the government had produced sufficient evidence to
support the existence of an "enterprise," the government had failed to
produce evidence independent of that used to support the existence of
the underlying predicate offenses. 22 Finally, he challenged the trial court's
finding that the use of stolen equipment in the drug manufacturing
of the statutorily prohibited activity of "inoperation was an instance
23
vestment of proceeds."
A. Definition of "Enterprise"
The trial court found that Hughes received stolen property and participated in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 24 The government
argued that these activities comprised the predicate acts of racketeering
activity and that they were performed with the intent of furthering a
drug manufacturing "enterprise. ' 25 Hughes argued that in order to prove
the existence of an "enterprise" the government must show the existence
of an association above and beyond that necessary to perform the acts
that are predicate to racketeering activity. 26 To bolster his argument,
Hughes cited a series of Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
interpreting the federal racketeering act (RICO). 27 The Eighth Circuit has
interpreted the RICO requirement of an "enterprise" to mean more than
the predicate acts constisimply an organization set up to commit only
2
tuting the pattern of racketeering activity.
The New Mexico court declined to follow the Eighth Circuit, noting
that the New Mexico legislature intended the broader view taken by the
majority of the federal courts that have interpreted the federal racketeering
statute. 29 The legislature expressly defined "enterprise" to include both
licit and illicit entities.3 0 Furthermore, the New Mexico definition of
"enterprise" includes any group of individuals and contains no limiting
language." Finally, the fact that the statute requires the finding of only

21. Id.
22. Id. at 149-50, 767 P.2d at"388-89.
23. Id. at 146-47, 767 P.2d at 385-86.
24. Id. at 146, 767 P.2d at 385.
25. See id. at 146-49, 767 P.2d at 385-88.
26. Id. at 147, 767 P.2d at 386.
27. Id. The federal racketeering act is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1984).
28. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bledsoe,
674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Phillips v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982);
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); see
also Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1983),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
29. Hughes, 108 N.M. at 149, 767 P.2d at 388 (citing United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied sub nom. Callanan v. United States, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Cagnina,
697 F.2d 915 (l1th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d
343 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Feldman v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1989); United
States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980)).
30. Hughes, 108 N.M. at 149, 767 P.2d at 388 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-2 (Repl. Pamp.
1989)).
31. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989)) (emphasis added).
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two predicate acts in order to trigger the penalty convinced the court
that "highly organized
and prolific criminal entities are not the only
'3 2
targets of the act."
In State v. Wynne,33 the court of appeals again faced an appeal of a
conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering arising from a drug
manufacturing operation. The court of appeals affirmed the view stated
in Hughes, without citing that case, holding that an "enterprise" may
exist even when there is no evidence of an association above and beyond
34
the acts which form the pattern of racketeering activity.
B. Proof of "Enterprise"
In Hughes, the court also addressed the issue of whether the government's proof of the enterprise may overlap with proof of the pattern
of racketeering activity.35 The United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Turkette 6 that a conviction under RICO requires proof of both
an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity. Some courts have
interpreted this requirement to mean that the government must prove the
existence of the enterprise without reference to the proof of the pattern
of racketeering activity.3 7 The court did not adopt this view in Hughes."
The court stated that the government may prove an enterprise by
showing that an association of persons possesses three qualities: a common
purpose among the participants, organization, and continuity.3 9 The court
further stated that the relevant factors to be considered include the identity
of the individuals, their knowledge of the relevant activities, the amount
of planning required to carry out the predicate acts, the frequency of
the acts, the time span between the acts, and the existence of an identifiable
structure within the entity.40
The court stated that the government may rely on some or all of the
same factors to prove the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of
racketeering activity. 4' The court also stated that the proof of a pattern
of racketeering activity does not necessarily prove the existence of an
enterprise, but the inference may be drawn from proof of a pattern of
racketeering activity in some cases. 42 The court held that in Hughes the
jury could properly have inferred the existence of an enterprise:

32. Id.
33. 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989).
34. Id. at 137, 767 P.2d at 376.
35. Hughes, 108 N.M. at 147-51, 767 P.2d at 386-90.
36. 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
37. E.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Jackson
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); but see United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Cianeaglini v. United States, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v. Griffin,
660 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nor. Garonzik v. United States, 454 U.S. 1156
(1982).
38. Hughes, 108 N.M. at 150, 767 P.2d at 389.
39. Id. (citing Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Here, the evidence demonstrated that the same four individuals were
involved in the manufacturing process. They participated in the process
at one- to two- week intervals, for a total of six or seven incidents
of manufacturing methamphetamines. . . [The operation required
planning and special knowledge and "felt like" a business to at least
one of the participants.] On these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that defendant was
43 in the business of manufacturing and
selling methamphetamines.
C. Definition of "Proceeds"
Hughes was convicted of using the proceeds of racketeering activity
in an enterprise contrary to section 30-42-4(A) of the Act." The government argued that under the circumstances of the case stolen laboratory
equipment, useful in manufacturing or distributing controlled substances,
constituted "proceeds. ' 45 The court of appeals agreed that the evidence
was sufficient to establish the "use or investment" of proceeds where
the "proceeds" invested were stolen laboratory equipment rather than
money. The court reasoned that since the statute refers to "use or
investment," but does not explicitly limit its terms to money, the correct
interpretation of "proceeds" is the broader one."
D. Sentencing
Hughes argued that his conviction for the predicate offense of conspiracy to traffic merged with his conviction for conspiracy to racketeer. 47
The court declined, however, to consider whether the conviction for
conspiracy to traffic was a lesser-included offense of Hughes' conviction
for conspiracy to racketeer because Hughes had received concurrent sen4
tences for the two convictions, thus obviating the double jeopardy issue. 8
The court of appeals also examined the issue of merger in State v.
Wynne. 49 The court found that Wynne's conviction for conspiracy to
racketeer merged with her conviction for conspiracy to traffic by manufacture.50 The court applied the rule, set out in State v. DeMary,5' that
whether an offense charged is an included offense of another offense
charged must be determined in light of the facts of the particular case.52

43. Id. at 150-51, 767 P.2d at 389-90.
44. Id. at 147, 767 P.2d at 386 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989)).
45. Id. Hughes conceded that there was evidence that proceeds of more than one act of drug
manufacture were invested in later acts of manufacture. Id. Nevertheless, the jury instruction required
the jury to find that the "proceeds" from the act of receiving stolen goods was invested in the
"enterprise." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 151, 767 P.2d at 390.
48. Id. (citing State v. Srader, 103 N.M. 205, 704 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1985)).
49. 108 N.M. 134, 767 P.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989).
50. Id. at 138, 767 P.2d'at 377.
51. 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982).
52. Wynne, 108 N.M. at 138, 767 P.2d at 377.
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The trial court had instructed the jury that in order to prove Wynne
guilty of conspiracy to racketeer, the government must have proved that

she agreed to engage in an enterprise for the manufacture of methamphetamine as a pattern of racketeering activity.53 In light of this instruction, the court held that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to
traffic by manufacture merged with her conviction for conspiracy to
racketeer, and therefore the court ordered the sentence for conspiracy
54

to traffic vacated.

III. OTHER OFFENSES
During the survey period the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the
elements of the crime of holding or using an altered license plate." The
court of appeals examined the statutory elements of fraud and the offenses
created by the Worthless Check Act and concluded that the statutes
prohibit different offenses. 5 6 In addition, the court of appeals held that
attempted trafficking by possession with intent to distribute constitutes

a crime in New Mexico. 57 The court of appeals also discussed the quantum
of evidence necessary to support the inference of "constructive possession"
of contraband. 8 Finally, the court of appeals examined
the entrapment
9

defense for the first time since Baca v. State.5
A. Altered License Plate Jury Instruction

In Ortiz v. State6° the supreme court reversed Ortiz' conviction for

using an altered license plate 6' because the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that in order to convict the jury must find that Ortiz knew that
the plate was altered with fraudulent intent. 62 The court further held that

the omission of the instruction was jurisdictional error,
and therefore
63
the error could be raised for the first time on appeal.
The jury instruction given by the trial court read in part:
For you to find the defendant guilty of holding or using an altered
license plate . . . the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:

53. Id.
54. Id. In State v. Johnson the court of appeals held that cumulative sentences may be imposed
for both racketeering and underlying predicate offenses. 105 N.M. 63, 70-71, 728 P.2d 473, 48081 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 (1987). In Wynne the court distinguished Johnson,
noting that Wynne involved conspiracy rather than the commission of substantive predicate offenses
and that Wynne entered into only one agreement concerning the crimes charged. Wynne, 108 N.M.
at 139, 767 P.2d at 378.
55. Ortiz v. State, 106 N.M. 695, 749 P.2d 80 (1988).
56. State v. Higgins, 107 N.M. 617, 762 P.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1988).
57. State v. Curry, 107 N.M. 133, 753 P.2d 1321 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753
P.2d 1320 (1988).
58. State v. Brietag, 108 N.M. 368, 772 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989).
59. State v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546
(1988); Baca v. State, 106 N.M. 338, 742 P.2d 1043 (1987).
60. 106 N.M. 695, 749 P.2d 80 (1988).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-3(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
62. Ortiz, 106 N.M, at 696, 749 P.2d at 81.
63. Id. at 698, 749 P.2d at 83.
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1. The defendant held or used a license plate which had been
altered;
2. At the time he used or held the license plate, the defendant
knew it had been altered. .... 6.
The proffered instruction did not include the element that the defendant6
used the plate knowing that it had been altered with fraudulent intent.
The court held that since proof of every element is essential, it did not
matter that Ortiz had not put his knowledge of the fraud at issue, nor
that he did not object to the jury instructions at trial.6
B. Fraud and the Worthless Check Act
In State v. Higgins,67 the court of appeals examined the statutory
elements of frauds and the offenses created by the Worthless Check Act
("the Act"). 69 Higgins was convicted of defrauding two financial institutions by creating a "false balance" in each institution by setting up
an account with non-existent funds and then writing bad checks on "starter
checks" issued by the institution." The court of appeals observed that
in order to convict Higgins of fraud, the jury was required to find that
Higgins obtained property from the financial institution, that the property
belonged to someone other than Higgins, and that the property had a
market value of over $2,500 in the case of the first count and $100 in
the case of the second.7 '
The court struck down these two convictions, reasoning that there was
no evidence that Higgins obtained anything of value from the financial
institutions. 72 There was no evidence that the "starter checks" had any
intrinsic value. 73 Furthermore, Higgins made no withdrawals from either
74
financial institution, nor did he receive any credit from either institution.
Higgins also argued that the Worthless Check Act deals with subject
matter identical to that of the fraud statute and that therefore he should

64. Id. at 697, 749 P.2d at 82.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 698, 749 P.2d at 83. Justice Stowers dissented. Stowers believed the jury instruction
was sufficient, as did the government and the majority in the court of appeals. Because there is
no legal way provided by statute or otherwise to alter a license plate, Stowers contended "that the
very definition of alter, as used in a legal context presumes an intent to defraud." Id. (Stowers,
J., dissenting).
67. 107 N.M. 617, 762 P.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1988).
68. See 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 119, § 1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-6 (Repl. Pamp.
1984); amended by 1987 N.M. Laws ch. 121, § 2 (codified at N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-16-6 (Cum.
Supp. 1989).
69. The Worthless Check Act is contained in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-36-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp.
1987).
70. Higgins, 107 N.M. at 619, 762 P.2d at 906.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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have been prosecuted only under the7 s Act, as the more specific statute
dealing with identical subject matter.
In reaching its holding that the Act was not an exception to the fraud
statute, the court examined the language of each statute and the elements
of each crime to determine if the statutes require the same proof to
76 The court
convict and whether the statutes condemn the same offenses.
77
statutes.
the
of
policies
also considered the purposes and
The court observed that while both crimes require a specific intent to
defraud, only fraud requires a showing that the victim relied on the
misrepresentation, proof that the property obtained belonged to someone
other than the defendant, and proof of the market value of the property
obtained by the defendant. 78 Conviction under the Act, but not conviction
of fraud, requires a showing that the defendant knew he could not cover
the check when he issued it, as well as proof of the value of the checkthat is to say, the loss to the victim. 79 Finally, the court held that the
legislative purpose of the fraud statute is to protect people from being
defrauded of their property, whereas the purpose of the Worthless Check
Act is to prevent mischief to commerce.80
C. Attempted Trafficking by Possession with Intent to Distribute
In State v. Curry,8 the court of appeals held that attempted trafficking
by possession with intent to distribute constitutes a crime in New Mexico.
Curry's neighbor intercepted a Federal Express shipment addressed to
Curry which contained a substantial amount of cocaine.8 2 Curry tried
several times to recover the package from the neighbor, but he never
possessed the drugs. 8 The court held that the jury could infer an intent
to distribute from the amount of the drugs the defendant sought to
possess. The jury could also infer an intent to possess from the actions
of the defendant.85 Thus the government met its burden of proving that

75. Id. at 619-20, 762 P.2d at 906-07 (citing State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208 (1936)
(when a general statute and a specific statute cover the same subject matter, in a criminal case the
defendant must be tried under the specific statute)).
76. Id. at 620, 762 P.2d at 907 (citing State v. Rhea, 94 N.M. 168, 608 P.2d 144 (1980); City
of Farmington v. Wilkins, 106 N.M. 188, 740 P.2d 1172 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174,
740 P.2d 1158 (1987); State v. Gutierrez, 88 N.M. 448, 541 P.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1975)).
77. Id. (citing State v. Cuevas, 94 N.M. 792, 617 P.2d 1307 (1980), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Pitts, 103 N.M. 778, 714 P.2d 582 (1986)).
78. Id. at 621, 762 P.2d at 908.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 107 N.M. 133, 753 P.2d 1321 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753 P.2d 1320 (1988).
82. Id. The courier entrusted the package to the neighbor because Curry was not at home. Id.
at 133, 753 P.2d at 1321. The courier left a delivery notice on Curry's door, which the neighbor
removed when her young daughter discovered a white powder in the package. Id.
83. Id. at 134, 753 P.2d at 1322. The neighbor had turned the package over to the police. Id.
Curry called Federal Express and learned that the package had been delivered to his neighbor, who
then frustrated Curry's repeated importunings by denying that she had the package. Id.
84. Id. (citing State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. ill, 666 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100
N.M. 53, 665 P.2d 809 (1983); State v. Quintana, 87 N.M. 414, 534 P.2d 1126 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975)).
85. Id.
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the defendant
attempted to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute
6
drug.1
the
Curry argued that it was impossible to attempt to have an intent, but
the court rejected this argument.17 The court observed that the state
supreme court has applied the general attempt statute 8 to the offense
of trafficking cocaine by distribution. 9 The court concluded that "[s]ince
defendant can intend to distribute a controlled substance without actually
possessing the substance, we see no reason why the general attempt statute
should not be applied to the offense of trafficking by possession with
intent to distribute."' 9
D. "Constructive Possession" of Contraband
In State v. Brietag,91 the court of appeals reversed a conviction for
possession of contraband based on a theory of "constructive possession"
because of insufficient evidence.
92
The police executed a search warrant for a house rented by Brietag.
Brietag was not present when the warrant was executed, and the evidence
suggested that he had only visited the house sporadically. 93 Seven or eight
persons were present in the house when the police searched it, and many
people had access to the house. 94 The search revealed contraband in a
bedroom which contained many personal items. 95 While some of these
items belonged to Brietag, many others may not have belonged to him. 96
The court held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
to support the inference that Brietag "constructively possessed" the contraband. 97 Constructive possession exists when the defendant has both
knowledge of the presence of the contraband and control over it. 9 Where
the defendant is not in exclusive possession of the premises-as in the
instant case-the jury can only infer constructive possession from incriminating statements or other circumstances tending to support the
inference. 99

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). The statute provides that an "[alttempt
to commit a felony consists of an overt act in furtherance of and with intent to commit a felony
and tending but failing to effect its commission." Id.
89. Curry, 107 N.M. at 135, 753 P.2d at 1323 (citing State v. Lopez, 100 N.M. 291, 669 P.2d
1086 (1983) (defendant could attempt to distribute cocaine even when distribution was rendered
impossible because the substance distributed was not, in fact, cocaine)).
.90. Id.
91. 108 N.M. 368, 772 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 369, 772 P.2d at 899.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 372, 772 P.2d at 902.
98. Id. at 370, 772 P.2d at 900 (citing State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (Ct. App.
1973)).
99. Id. (citing State v. Herrera, 90 N.M. 306, 563 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Bowers,
87 N.M. 74, 529 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1974)).
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Because Brietag made no incriminating statements, the issue facing the
court turned on the sufficiency of evidence of incriminating circumstances.' °0 The contraband was found in close proximity not only to
Brietag's personal belongings, but also to the belongings of several other
people.' 0' Because several people occupied the bedroom, there was no
"rational connection between the location of the drugs and defendant's
02
probable knowledge and control of them.'
The court characterized as "significant" the fact that Brietag was
absent from the house when the search took place. 03 In otherwise similar
circumstances, therefore, the court might allow the jury to infer constructive possession if the defendant were on the premises when the
warrant was executed.
E. The Entrapment Defense
In State v. Rodriguez,1'1 the court of appeals held that to claim
entrapment the defendant cannot deny that the underlying act took
place. 05 The defendant need not actually testify if other evidence supports
entrapment." °6 However, the defense is not available to the defendant
Who denies committing the offense because its invocation necessarily
involves the commission of at least some elements of the offense.' °1
At trial, Rodriguez initially declined to take the stand. 08 The government
offered the testimony of police officers who had engaged the services of
Rodriguez as a police informant.'09 The officers testified that they had
instructed Rodriguez to help the police set up drug deals." 0 An undercover
agent then testified that Rodriguez had sold him imitation controlled
substances."' Rodriguez was unaware that the man was an undercover
agent."12
The court of appeals held that this testimony, standing alone, was
insufficient to allow a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. "3

100. Id.
101. Id. The court noted thai courts have allowed the inference of constructive possession where
drugs were found in close proximity to the defendant's personal belongings (citing Gary v. State,
473 So. 2d 604 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) and People v. Richardson, 139 Mich. App. 622, 362 N.W.2d
853 (1984)).
102. Brietag, 108 N.M. at 370-71, 772 P.2d at 900-01.
103. Id. at 371, 772 P.2d at 901.
104. 107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988).
105. Id.at 616, 762 P.2d at 903 (citing United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 874 (1987); State v. Garcia, 79 N.M. 367, 443 P.2d 860 (1968)).
106. Id. (citing Mabry, 809 F.2d 671; State v. Garcia, 79 N.M. 367, 443 P.2d 860 (1968)).
Evidence of entrapment requires showing either lack of predisposition to commit the crime charged
or that the police "exceeded the proper standards of proper investigation." Baca v. State, 106 N.M.
338, 341, 742 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1987).
107. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 616, 762 P.2d at 903 (citing Mabry, 809 F.2d 671; Garcia, 79 N.M.
367, 443 P.2d 860).
108. Id.at 613, 762 P.2d at 900.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 616, 762 P.2d at 903.
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There was no evidence that Rodriguez was subject to undue persuasion
or enticement to commit the offenses charged. 1 4 The court relied on
State v. Fiechter"5 and Uniform Jury Instruction (Criminal) 14-516016
for the proposition that "[elntrapment requires a showing that a law
enforcement officer initiated a criminal act or used undue persuasion or
enticement in order to induce the defendant to commit a crime and that,
without such conduct, the defendant would not have committed the
crime. "117
Rodriguez argued that Baca v. State"' controlled and that under the
Baca holding he had been entrapped." 9 Baca expanded the defense of
entrapment in New Mexico by providing that a defendant may assert the
defense of entrapment by showing either lack of predisposition to commit
the crime for which he is charged 20 or that the police exceeded the
standards of proper investigation.' 2, In the instant case, the court held
that the facts were distinguishable from those of Baca-without saying
how-and held that the instant case did not fall within the modified
22
prospective application of Baca.1
Thus, Rodriguez does not shed any
light on how courts should proceed under the new Baca entrapment
standard.
IV. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI) OR WHILE UNDER
THE INFLUENCE (DUI)
During the survey period defendants raised several challenges to drunk
driving laws and the procedure involved in arrest and prosecution of
23
drunk drivers. This article has therefore grouped these cases together.
114. Id.
115. 89 N.M. 74, 547 P.2d 557 (1976).
116. The jury instruction provides:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was induced to commit the crime
by law enforcement officers or their agents. For you to find the defendant guilty,
the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was already willing to commit the crime and that the law enforcement
officials or their agents merely gave him the opportunity.
SuP. CT. RULES ANN. 14-5160 (Recomp. 1986).
117. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 616, 762 P.2d at 903.
118. 106 N.M. 338, 742 P.2d 1043.
119. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 616, 762 P.2d at 903 (citing Baca, 106 N.M. at 339, 742 P.2d at
1044).
120. This is essentially the rule stated in Fiechter, 89 N.M. at 77, 547 P.2d at 560.
121. Baca, 106 N.M. at 339, 742 P.2d at 1044. For a full discussion of Baca, see Note, New
Mexico Expands the Entrapment Defense: Baca v. State, 20 N.M.L. REV. 135 (1990).
122. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. at 616-17, 762 P.2d at 903-04.
123. Not covered in the text of this survey is State ex rel. Taxation and Motor Vehicle Dep't
v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 760 P.2d 1302 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d
200 (1988), in which the court of appeals considered the propriety of a police investigatory stop
of a vehicle prompted by an anonymous and uncorroborated tip. The stop led to the driver's refusal
to take a blood-alcohol test and ultimately to the appealed-from administrative hearing in which
defendant lost his driver's license. Id. at 537-38, 760 P.2d 1303-04. The court analyzed the case
using traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence and upheld the stop and subsequent test. Id. at
538-39, 760 P.2d at 1304-05.
Two other DWI cases, State v. Lucero, 108 N.M. 548, 775 P.2d 750 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240 (1989), and State v. Bishop, 108 N.M. 105, 766 P.2d 1339 (Ct. App.
1988), interpreted the six-month speedy trial rule. For a discussion of Lucero and Bishop, see this
issue, Survey of Criminal Procedure, notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
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In Meyer v. Jones,2 " the supreme court rejected an equal protection
challenge to the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court practice of denying
jury trials for first DWI offenses. In IncorporatedCounty of Los Alamos
v. Montoya, 21 the court of appeals rejected an equal protection challenge
to a county DWI ordinance. The Montoya court also rejected an attack
on the ordinance on the ground that the ordinance was inconsistent with
the state DWI statute. In State v. Wyrostek, 26 the court of appeals
interpreted the Implied Consent Act. The court of appeals also evaluated
statutory limitations on blood-alcohol testing procedure in State v.
27
Wiberg.1
A. Equal Protection and the Right to a Jury
In Meyer v. Jones,1 2 1 the supreme court held that a statute requiring
that certain offenses be tried by a judge in Bernalillo County Metropolitan
Court does not deny defendants equal protection of the law. The statute
does not violate equal protection even though the defendants would have
a right to a jury trial if tried for the same offenses in magistrate courts
29
elsewhere in the state.
Meyer challenged his conviction for DWI during a mandatory bench
trial in Bernalillo County. 30 Metropolitan court judges are statutorily
required to try cases in which the penalty does not exceed ninety days
imprisonment as bench trials. 3 ' Upon a petition for a writ of mandamus,
the district court held that Meyer was denied equal protection of the
32
law when the metropolitan court denied his request for a jury trial.
In support of Meyer's equal protection claim, the district court pointed
out that a metropolitan court is by statute a magistrate court for all
purposes of state law and that the right to trial by jury exists in all
magistrate court proceedings.' 33 Because he was deprived of a jury in
Bernalillo County, but would have had a jury trial elsewhere in the state,
Meyer argued,
and the district court agreed, that he was denied equal
4
protection.
The supreme court first noted that the distinction between serious and
petty offenses in the right-to-a-jury-trial context turns on the length of

124.
125.
126.
(1989).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
35-8-1
134.

106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93 (1988).
108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 273, 771 P.2d 981 (1989).
108 N.M. 140, 767 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
107 N.M. 152, 754 P.2d 529 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 106, 753 P.2d 352 (1988).
106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93.
Id. at 713, 749 P.2d at 98.
Id. at 709, 749 P.2d at 94.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-5(B)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
Meyer, 106 N.M. at 709, 749 P.2d at 94.
See id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) (metropolitan court) and §
(Supp. 1988) (right to a jury trial)).
See id. at 709-10, 749 P.2d at 94-95.
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imprisonment, not on the length of probation.

35

The court examined

several United States Supreme Court cases and concluded that the penalty
available to the trial judge in the3 6instant case did not implicate the
constitutional right to a jury trial.
Turning to Meyer's state and federal equal protection claims, the
supreme court noted that in New Mexico the standard for reviewing state
37
equal protection claims is the same as that for reviewing federal claims.
The court therefore applied standards employed by the United States
Supreme Court.' Because the case did not implicate the fundamental
right to a jury trial 39 and did not involve a suspect classification, 140 the
court held that it was only required to decide whether the statute had

a rational basis. ''

Although not bound by federal precedent in this matter, 42 the court
found federal decisions regarding geographic distinctions "worthy of
43

consideration" in scrutinizing the challenged statute for a rational basis.1

The court observed that the United States Supreme Court has said that
the equal protection clause protects "equality between persons as such,
rather than between areas,"'" and that, under the equal protection clause,
"territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite." '4 The court
further observed that "[a] body of United States Supreme Court cases

supports the proposition that in matters concerning concentrations of
population, a state government may enact in one part of the state
'substantive restrictions and variations in [criminal] procedure that would
differ from those elsewhere in the state." ' 46 The court reasoned that as
long as the legislation treats equally all people under similar circumstances
within a given section of a state, the legislation does not violate the
147
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

135. Id. at 710, 749 P.2d at 95. The statute under which the defendant was charged provided
that the penalty for a first conviction for DWI is confinement of at least 30 but not more than
90 days, or a fine, or both. In addition, conviction may carry a probationary sentence exceeding
ninety days but no more than three years if any part of the sentence or fine is suspended. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
136. Meyer, 106 N.M. at 710, 749 P.2d at 95 (citing Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 15152 (1969)).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699
(Ct. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046 (1981)).
139. See supra notes 133 and 134.
140. The Meyer court did not state the basis for this assertion. See Meyer, 106 N.M. at 711,
749 P.2d at 96. Cf. Inc. County of Los Alamos v. Montoya, 108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 273, 771 P.2d 981 (1989); see infra at notes 149-80 and accompanying
text.
141. Meyer, 106 N.M. at 711, 749 P.2d at 96.
142. The district court's decision was based on N.M. CoNsr. art. II, § 18 as well as the federal
equal protection clause. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961)).
145. Id. (citing McGowan, 366 U.S. at 427; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879)).
146. Id. at 712, 749 P.2d at 97 (quoting Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954); and
citing North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1976) and Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887)).
147. Id. (citing North, 427 U.S. at 338, and Lewis, 101 U.S. at 31).
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The court concluded that the statute in question was supported by a
rational legislative purpose:
[W]e are persuaded that, because of the legislature's requirement that
magistrate judges in metropolitan court be attorneys and magistrates
elsewhere throughout the state need not meet that qualification, the
disallowance of juries in metropolitan court is not arbitrary, unreasonable nor unrelated to a legitimate legislative purpose. All persons
within Bernalillo County are treated equally, and the classification
may be justified on grounds of judicial economy, as well as on the
advanced judicial qualifications of the magistrates presiding over those
cases. 4 s
B. Equal Protection and Stricter County Ordinance
In Incorporated County of Los Alamos v. Montoya,149 the court of
appeals upheld several DWI convictions under a Los Alamos County
municipal ordinance. 50 The court held that the ordinance, which required
a minimum sentence more severe than that provided by the state DWI
statute,' was constitutional. 5 2 The defendants had argued that they were
denied equal protection of the law because they were punished more
harshly under the153 county ordinance than they would have been under
the state statute.
The defendants claimed that the existence of two laws, the state statute
and the county ordinance, penalizing the same conduct, allowed the
charging authorities unconstitutional leeway to subject one person to a

148. Id. at 713, 749 P.2d at 98.
149. 108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 273, 771 P.2d 981 (1989).
150. Los ALAmos CouNTY, N.M. CODE § 10.24.140(C) (1986). The ordinance requires first offenders
whose blood alcohol level is greater than 0.15 % and who are convicted under the ordinance to
serve a mandatory jail term of 72 hours. Montoya, 108 N.M. at 363, 772 P.2d at 893.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides for fines or jail sentences which
may be suspended or deferred for first offenders whose blood alcohol level is greater than
0.10 %.

152. 108 N.M. at 368, 772 P.2d at 898. In an additional holding not discussed below, the court
rejected an argument that the municipal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. While the state
DWI statute gives concurrent jurisdiction to magistrate and district courts in cases brought under
the statute, it also provides that "this section does not affect the authority of a municipality under
a proper ordinance to prescribe penalties for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors
or drugs." Id. at 364, 772 P.2d at 894 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(F) (Repl. Pamp.
1987)).
The court also rejected an argument that the municipal ordinance, which provides for mandatory
jail sentences for first offenders, conflicted with the state statute, which grants the trial judge the
discretion to defer the sentence on the condition that the driver attend a driver rehabilitation program.
Id. at 365, 772 P.2d at 895. The court noted that the maximum penalty imposed under the ordinance
does not exceed that prescribed under the statute. Id.
In determining that the county ordinance complemented the state law rather than conflicted with
it, the court applied the tests enunciated in City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917
(Ct. App. 1970). Montoya, 108 N.M. at 365, 772 P.2d at 895. In Montoya, the court restated the
tests as "whether the stricter requirements of the ordinance conflict with state law, and whether
the ordinance permits an act the general law prohibits, or prohibits an act the general law permits."
Id.

153. See id. at 365-67, 772 P.2d at 895-97.
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greater punishment than another who committed an identical act.3 4 The
defendants based their argument on State v. Chavez.' In Chavez the
New Mexico Supreme Court stated in dictum, "We no longer subscribe
to [the] view which would permit the law enforcement authorities to
subject one person to the possibility of a greater punishment than another
who has committed an identical- act."'15 6 To do so, according to the
Chavez court, "would do violence57 to the equal protection clauses of our
state and federal constitutions."'
The State argued that the United States Supreme Court overruled Chavez
in United States v. Batchelder.' In Batchelder, the Supreme Court held
that the federal equal protection clause does not forbid duplicative federal
criminal statutes unless the defendant can show a discriminatory basis
for prosecution under one rather than the other statute.' 59 The court of
appeals did not find Batchelder to be dispositive of Montoya. 6 Batchelder
involved the application of overlapping statutes within the same jurisdiction.' 6' The court stated that when, as in Montoya, different jurisdictions have enacted overlapping or identical legislation, the appropriate
equal protection analysis is threefold: the court must determine 1) whether
the challenged ordinance has a rational basis; 2) whether the challenged
ordinance impermissibly punishes offenders more severely than they would
be punished elsewhere in the state; and 3) whether defendants are denied
equal. protection where enforcement officers
exercise discretion to charge
162
under one or the other overlapping law.
The court first held that the ordinance had a rational basis. 163 The
court gave three reasons why the ordinance was not discriminatory on
its face. First, the ordinance treated similarly all persons with blood154. Id. at 365-66, 772 P.2d at 895-96.
155. 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966).
156. Montoya, 108 N.M. at 366, 772 P.2d at 896 (quoting Chavez, 77 N.M. at 82, 419 P.2d at
459).
157. Id. (quoting Chavez, 77 N.M. at 82, 419 P.2d at 459).
158. 422 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979).
159. Id. at 125. In Montoya, the court noted that a majority of jurisdictions have followed
Batchelder. 108 N.M. at 366, 772 P.2d at 896 (citing Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985); Crews v. State, 366 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d
1151 (Me. 1983); State v. Secrest, 331 N.W.2d 580 (S.D.), dismissed by 464 U.S. 802 (1983); State
v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1126 (1986)). The court
also noted that a minority of jurisdictions have not adopted the standard. 108 N.M. at 366, 772
P.2d at 896 (citing People v. Mumaugh, 644 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); People v. Estrada,
198 Colo. 188, 601 P.2d 619 (1979) (en banc); State v. Jessup, 31 Wash. App. 304, 641 P.2d 1185
(1982)).
In Montoya, the court noted that City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 619 P.2d 217
(1980), overruled State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955). Pirkey was cited by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Chavez. Montoya, 108 N.M. at 366, 772 P.2d at 896.
160. Montoya, 108 N.M. at 366-67, 772 P.2d at 896-97. The court noted that it was compelled
to follow the precedent of the New Mexico Supreme Court, regardless of whether a United States
Supreme Court decision seemed to the contrary. Id at 366, 772 P.2d at 896 (citing State v. Manzanares,
100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1057 (1985)).
161. Id. at 366-67, 772 P.2d at 896-97 (citing State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1983); but
see State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 378 N.W. 2d 691 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1126 (1986)).
162. Id. at 367, 772 P.2d at 897.
163. Id.
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alcohol levels of 0.15 percent or more.164 Second, the legislature provided65
for mandatory jail time for a second DWI offense under the state statute.1
And third, the class of intoxicated drivers is not a suspect class for equal
protection purposes. 16
The court then stated that "territorial uniformity is not a constitutional
prerequisite."'' 67 Therefore, the defendants were not denied equal protection because they were punished more severely under the ordinance
than they would have been elsewhere. 68 The court supplied no instance
when a local ordinance would fail this second prong of the test for
overlapping statutes.
Finally, the court examined the issue of whether the existence of
overlapping laws improperly allowed the government discretion to charge
defendants under either a harsh or a more lenient law.' 69 The court first
held that the defendants were not denied equal protection as a matter
of federal constitutional law, because the defendants did not demonstrate
that the government chose to prosecute them under the stricter statute
for unconstitutional reasons. 70 Next, the court held that the defendants
did not have standing to raise a state constitutional claim, because the
record failed to demonstrate that the ordinance as applied
against the
17
defendants violated the defendants' constitutional rights. 1
The defendants conceded that county law enforcement officers charge
72
all offenders under the local ordinance rather than the state statute.
Although the officers have discretion whether to cite offenders into
magistrate or municipal court, the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over the ordinance. 73 Therefore there was no discrimination, and defendants had no standing to claim a Chavez violation because no state
official exercised discretion whether to charge a defendant under the local
17
ordinance or the state statute.
After Montoya, it appears that if a defendant proves that he was
subject to "the possibility of a greater punishment than another who
has committed an identical act, ' ' 75 the court of appeals would dismiss
the charges under Chavez, provided that the defendant shows an actual
exercise of discretion by a law enforcement officer. 76 Furthermore, the
court noted in Montoya that the supreme court might not overrule Chavez

164.
47 and
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. (citing Meyer v. Jones, 106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93 (1988) (discussed at supra notes 128accompanying text)).
Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
Id. (citing Meyer, 106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93).
Id. (citing Meyer, 106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 93).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979)).
Id. (citing State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670, 642 P.2d 1129 (Ct. App. 1982)).

Id.
Id. (citing N.M.

STAT. ANN. § 35-3-4(A) (Supp. 1988)).
See id. at 367, 772 P.2d at 897.
Chavez, 77 N.M. at 81, 419 P.2d at 458.
See Montoya, 108 N.M. at 367, 772 P.2d at 897.
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even if it should reconsider that case in light of Batchelder.',' The supreme
court could conclude that Batchelder applies only to overlapping statutes,
and not to identical statutes. 178 Second, and more important, the state's
supreme court may interpret the equal protection clause of the New
Mexico Constitution 7 9 to be broader than that of the United States
Constitution. 180
C. Implied Consent and the Arrest of an Unconscious Suspect
In State v. Wyrostek,18' the court of appeals held that the Implied
Consent Act 82 does not require that an unconscious suspect be formally
arrested before being subjected to a blood-alcohol test. The government
appealed from the trial court's suppression of the results of a bloodalcohol test performed on the defendant while the defendant was unconscious. 183 Wyrostek, who remained unconscious from the time the
officer arrived at the scene of the accident until after the blood test was
performed at a hospital, was not formally arrested until his arraignment.'84
Section 66-8-107 mandates that motorists consent to a blood test "if
arrested for any offense arising out of the acts alleged to have been
committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor or any drug."' 85
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that to read the
statute literally and to require the arrest of an unconscious person would
be to require a useless act. 18 6 Moreover, the court noted that in New
Mexico a person is deemed to be arrested when his freedom of action
is restricted by a police officer and he is subject to the control of the
officer. 187 Since an unconscious person's freedom of action is already
restricted, reasoned the court, it188would be useless to require a formal
arrest under such circumstances.

177. See id. at 366-67, 772 P.2d at 896-97.
178. See id.See also State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1983); but see State v. Cissell, 127
Wis. 2d 205, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1126 (1986).
179. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
180. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 469, 595 P.2d
592, 598, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20-21 (1979); Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 129 (Mont. 1978).
The courts have frequently analyzed both state and federal equal protection clauses when considering
equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 15-21, 485 P.2d 529,
538-42, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 338-42 (1971); State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627
(N.D. 1977); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 199, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973). But cf. Meyer,
106 N.M. at 710, 749 P.2d at 95 and supra note 129 and accompanying text.
181. 108 N.M. 140, 767 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989).
182. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 141, 767 P.2d at 380.
185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) (emphasis added).
186. Wyrostek, 108 N.M. at 142, 767 P.2d at 381.
187. Id. (citing Boone v. State, 105 N.M. 223, 227, 731 P.2d 366, 370 (1986) (citing State v.
Frazier, 88 N.M. 103, 105, 537 P.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 1975))).
188. Id.
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Wyrostek argued that the arrest requirement forces the police to focus
on probable cause prior to intruding on the suspect's body.8 9 The court
noted, however, that the Act has an independent, built-in probable cause
requirement and held that this vitiated the defendant's argument.'19
D. Blood-Alcohol Testing
In State v. Wiberg, 19' the court of appeals held that a nurse who
performs a blood-alcohol test need not be employed by a physician or
a hospital, Wiberg was convicted of driving while under the influence
and vehicular homicide, great bodily harm by vehicle, and reckless driving,
all while under the influence of alcohol. 92 He appealed the trial court's
refusal to suppress the evidence of a blood-alcohol test performed on
him by a licensed practical nurse employed by a temporary services agency
that the
under contract with the police to test blood. 193 Wiberg argued
194
test as performed was illegal under the New Mexico statute.
The relevant statutory language provides: "Only a physician, licensed
professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist
employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any
person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test."' 95 Wiberg argued
that this language describes two classes of persons and that the employment
clause applies to all persons listed after the comma.' 96 He argued further
that read this way, the statute guarantees that nurses and technicians97
drawing samples will be adequately trained to perform the task reliably.
Finally, Wiberg argued that New Mexico case law required that the
language of the statute be strictly construed because the purpose of the
statute is penal. 98
The court of appeals applied the "last antecedent doctrine"' 99 and held
that the employment clause applies to "technologist," but not to the
more remote terms, thereby interpreting the statute so as to find no
illegality under the facts. 200 The court reasoned that Wiberg's interpretation
of the statute would thwart the "salutary and necessary" purposes of
the legislature. 20 1 The court also noted that the legislature has already

189. Id.
190. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)(a test of blood or breath
shall be administered at the direction of an enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds for
believing the person has been driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs)).
191. 107 N.M. 152, 754 P.2d 529 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 106, 753 P.2d 352 (1988).
192. Id. at 153, 754 P.2d at 530.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 154, 754 P.2d at 531 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-103 (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
195. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-103 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
196. Wiberg, 107 N.M. at 154, 754 P.2d at 531.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 156, 754 P.2d at 533 (citing State v. Garcia, 91 N.M. 664, 579 P.2d 790 (1978)).
199. Id. at 155, 754 P.2d at 532 (citing In re Goldsworthy's Estate, 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627
(1941)). The court restated the doctrine: "[R]elative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses are
to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending
to or including others more remote." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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provided schemes to assure that nurses are well trained. 202 Finally, the
court observed that section 103 does not itself punish offenses against
the state and is not a penal statute requiring strict construction. 230
WILL O'CONNELL
BARBARA A. MANDEL, Ed.

202. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-3-13 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (licensing requirements
for professional nurses)).
203. Id. at 156, 754 P.2d at 533 (citing Dennison v. Tocker, 55 N.M. 184, 229 P.2d 285 (1951)
(the purpose of a penal statute is to punish offenses against the state)).

